Explaining the forgetting bias effect on value judgments: the influence of memory for a past test by Rhodes, Matthew, G. et al.
Explaining the forgetting bias effect on 
value judgments: the influence of memory 
for a past test 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Rhodes, M., G., Witherby, A., E., Castel, A., D. and 
Murayama, K. (2017) Explaining the forgetting bias effect on 
value judgments: the influence of memory for a past test. 
Memory & Cognition, 45 (3). pp. 362­374. ISSN 1532­5946 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421­016­0674­z Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/68203/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work. 
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421­016­0674­z 
Publisher: Springer 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
Running head: EXPLAINING THE FORGETTING BIAS 
  
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explaining the Forgetting Bias Effect on Value Judgments: 
The Influence of Memory for a Past Test 
 
Matthew G. Rhodes 
Colorado State University 
Amber E. Witherby 
Texas Christian University 
Alan D. Castel 
University of California, Los Angeles 
Kou Murayama 
University of Reading 
 
Author Note 
Matthew G. Rhodes, Department of Psychology, Colorado State University; Amber E. 
Witherby, Department of Psychology, Texas Christian University; Alan D. Castel, Department 
of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles; Kou Murayama, School of Psychology 
and Clinical Language Sciences, University of Reading. 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Matthew G. Rhodes, 
Department of Psychology, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, 80523-1876.  E-mail: 
matthew.rhodes@colostate.edu. 
EXPLAINING THE FORGETTING BIAS 
  
   
2 
Abstract 
 
People often feel that information that was forgotten is less important than remembered 
information. Prior work has shown that participants assign higher importance to remembered 
information while undervaluing forgotten information. The current study examined two possible 
accounts of this finding.  In three experiments, participants studied lists of words in which each 
word was randomly assigned a point value denoting the value of remembering the word. 
Following the presentation of each list participants engaged in a free recall test. After the 
presentation of all lists participants were shown each of the words they had studied and asked to 
recall the point value that was initially paired with each word.  Experiment 1 tested a fluency-
based account by presenting items for value judgments in a low-fluency or high-fluency format.  
Experiment 2 examined whether value judgments reflect attributions based on the familiarity of 
an item when value judgments are made.  Finally, in Experiment 3, we evaluated whether 
participants believe that forgotten words are less important by having them judge whether an 
item was initially recalled or forgotten prior to making a value judgment.  Manipulating the 
fluency of an item presented for judgment had no influence on value ratings (Experiment 1) and 
familiarity exerted a limited influence on value judgments (Experiment 2).  More importantly, 
participants’ value judgments appeared to reflect a theory that remembered information is more 
valuable than forgotten information (Experiment 3). Overall, the present work suggests that 
individuals may apply a theory about remembering and forgetting to retrospectively assess the 
value of information.  
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Explaining the Forgetting Bias Effect on Value Judgments: The Influence of Memory for a 
Past Test 
 
 Each day we are inundated with information and face the task of determining what is 
important and unimportant. The information deemed important is, hopefully, encoded 
sufficiently for later use whereas the unimportant information is easily discarded.  Indeed, many 
researchers have posited that a healthy memory system is predicated on the ability to diminish, 
expunge, forget, or somehow render inaccessible information that is no longer relevant (e.g., 
Anderson & Schooler, 2000; Bjork, 2011) and to focus on the most important information 
(Castel, 2008).  Although a great deal of work has considered how the importance of information 
affects encoding and retrieval, very little research has examined how retrieval may influence the 
importance we assign to information.  Castel, Rhodes, McCabe, Soderstrom and Loaiza (2012) 
reported a notable exception, observing that forgotten information was perceived as less 
important than remembered information.  Accordingly, in this paper, we describe and test two 
accounts of such a forgetting bias and attempt to elucidate the mechanisms that drive 
retrospective evaluations of the value of remembered and forgotten information. 
Value-Directed Remembering and the Forgetting Bias 
 The relative importance of information can influence what is later remembered.  Castel 
and colleagues have reported abundant evidence for the selective nature of encoding and 
remembering, such that individuals are more likely to remember highly valuable information 
than less valuable information, a finding termed value-directed remembering (Castel, 2008).  For 
example, Castel, Benjamin, Craik, and Watkins (2002, Experiment 1) had participants study 
words that were arbitrarily paired with numbers indicating the value of remembering that 
information with higher numbers indicating more valuable information.  Across multiple study-
test cycles, participants were more likely to remember high-value relative to low-value 
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information.  Subsequent studies have similarly demonstrated a memorial benefit for valuable 
information.  For example, value-directed remembering is evident across the lifespan (Castel, 
Humphreys, Lee, Galván, Balota, & McCabe, 2011; Hayes, Kelly, & Smith, 2013; Koriat, 
Ackerman, Adiv, Lockl, & Schneider, 2014) and is impaired in individuals with 
neuropsychological (Castel, Balota, & McCabe, 2009) or attentional deficits (Castel, Lee, 
Humphreys, & Moore, 2011).  Further, the influence of value on remembering has been 
demonstrated when attempting to remember faces (DeLozier & Rhodes, 2015), names (Festini, 
Hartley, Tauber, & Rhodes, 2013), and information in more complex scenarios, such as the 
amount of money one is owed (Castel, Friedman, McGillivray, Flores, Murayama, Kerr, & 
Drolet, 2016), the health risks of medication (Friedman, McGillivray, Murayama, & Castel, 
2015), and the risks of food-borne allergies (Middlebrooks, McGillivray, Murayama, & Castel, 
in press).  In addition, these effects have been examined using neuropsychological models and 
methods (e.g., Adcock, Thangavel, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Knutson, & Gabrieli, 2006; Cohen, 
Rissman, Suthana, Castel, & Knowlton, 2016) to determine how dopamine and semantic 
processing give rise to better memory for high-value information.  Other data suggest that, when 
given the opportunity to control their own learning, individuals prioritize high-value information 
(e.g., DeLozier & Rhodes, 2015; Castel, Murayama, Friedman, McGillivray, & Link, 2013; 
Koriat, Ma’ayan, & Nussinson, 2006). 
 Although demonstrations of value-directed remembering are legion, there is far less 
evidence on how valuable and less valuable information is retrospectively judged, particularly 
when that information has been forgotten.  A possibility is that information once deemed 
valuable may be downgraded in importance when it is forgotten.  For example, one might 
explain forgetting to send an email to a colleague as a consequence of a message that was not 
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particularly important.  Castel et al. (2012) tested this possibility by having participants 
retrospectively judge the value of information following a memory test (see also Madan & 
Specht, 2012).  Specifically, they had participants study lists of words with each word randomly 
paired with a value from 1 to 12. Immediately after the presentation of each list participants 
completed a free recall test in which they were instructed to recall as many words from that list 
as possible. Following the final free recall test, participants were given a sheet of paper with all 
of the words that had been presented and instructed to recall the value that was initially 
associated with each word.  Consistent with prior work on value-based remembering, recall was 
positively related to the value associated with each item during the study phase.  Most important 
for present purposes, participants rated remembered items as being more valuable than forgotten 
items, a finding that held even when controlling for the actual study value of the item. 
A second experiment demonstrated that the forgetting bias extends to the subjective value 
an individual assigns to information.  Specifically, participants were given personality traits (e.g., 
honest, intelligent, vulgar) and rank-ordered the value of each trait when evaluating a significant 
other on a scale from 1-8.  These traits were then re-presented as study items, accompanied by 
the value the participant had assigned in the earlier rating phase.  On a subsequent free recall test, 
participants were more likely to remember high-value relative to low-value items.  Following 
this test, participants were given a list of the studied traits and asked to recall the value associated 
with each.  As in Experiment 1, participants provided higher ratings for remembered compared 
with forgotten traits.  Thus, Castel et al.’s (2012) results are indicative of a forgetting bias—
individuals deem forgotten information to be less important than remembered information.    
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Potential Accounts of the Forgetting Bias 
Although Castel et al. (2012) reported a robust forgetting bias, the source of this bias 
remains unclear.  Castel et al. suggested that the relative, perceived fluency of an item (cf. Kelley 
& Rhodes, 2002) may drive the forgetting bias. Specifically, remembered items may be 
perceived as more fluent and thus familiar and receive higher value ratings while forgotten items 
may be perceived as less fluent/familiar and receive lower value ratings. Indeed, manipulating 
the fluency of an item can affect the perceived familiarity of that item. For example, Whittlesea, 
Jacoby, and Girard (1990) presented participants with a short list of words followed by a test 
word, which was covered with either a light or heavy mask. Participants were both faster to 
identify the word and more likely to report that the test word was “old” when it was covered with 
a light mask as opposed to a heavy mask. Thus, the perception of fluency may create higher 
levels of familiarity (see also e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Westerman, 2008).  
Along with feelings of familiarity, there has also been an abundance of research showing 
the influence of perceptual fluency on many other metacognitive judgments (e.g., Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2009; Kleider & Goldinger, 2004; Johnston, Dark, & Jacoby, 1985; Reber & 
Schwarz, 1999; Song & Schwarz, 2008; Werth & Strack, 2003).  For example, Werth and Strack 
(2003) had participants study questions and answers in formats that were easy (high figure-
ground contrast) or difficult (low figure-ground contrast) to read.  Participants were then asked to 
judge the likelihood that they would have known the answer.  Easily read items elicited higher 
ratings that the participant would have known the answer.  Reber and Schwarz (1999) likewise 
reported that participants were more likely to endorse statements such as “Osorno is in Chile” if 
the statement was presented in an easy-to-read color.  The forgetting bias may similarly reflect a 
fluency-based attribution.  That is, recalled words may be more fluent/familiar and thus regarded 
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as more valuable.  Conversely, participants may have lower feelings of fluency/familiarity for 
forgotten words and thus assigned them lower values.  We tested this account by manipulating 
perceptual fluency of items when they were presented for a value rating (Experiment 1) and by 
manipulating the familiarity of an item prior to making a value rating (Experiment 2).   
In addition to the fluency hypothesis, it is also possible that the forgetting bias may be 
driven by a general belief that remembered information is more important than forgotten 
information (cf. Mueller, Dunlosky, Tauber, & Rhodes, 2014). That is, participants may believe 
that if they remembered an item it must be important and thus assign it a high value within an 
experimental context that asks them to consider prior study value. Conversely, participants may 
interpret forgetting an item with the belief that it was unimportant and thus assign it a low value. 
To that end, participants may assign value to an item following a two-stage process.  First, 
participants attempt to remember whether an item was recalled during the initial phase.  Next, 
based on this memory for a past test, items that are recalled as “remembered” are assigned a 
value within the upper end of the possible range of values and items recalled as “forgotten” are 
assigned a low value in the possible range of values.  That is, participants may hold a theory that 
remembered information is more valuable than forgotten information and apply this theory to 
value judgments after interrogating memory for the prior test.   
Finn and Metcalfe (2007; 2008; see also Serra & Ariel, 2014) have provided compelling 
evidence that memory for a past test influences a different domain of judgment: Predictions of 
future memory performance (i.e., Judgments of Learning or JOLs; see Rhodes, 2016, for a 
review) for the same items across multiple study-test trials.  Participants typically demonstrate an 
underconfidence with practice effect in such situations (Koriat, Sheffer, & Ma’ayan, 2002), 
exhibiting overconfidence on an initial trial (i.e., JOLs exceed performance) and 
EXPLAINING THE FORGETTING BIAS 
  
   
8 
underconfidence on subsequent trials (i.e., JOLs underestimate performance).  One factor leading 
to underconfidence on later trials is that participants use their memory-for-past-test as a basis for 
judgment.  Accordingly, items remembered on a past trial are given high JOLs and items 
forgotten on a past trial are given low JOLs, leading participants to underestimate additional 
learning and exhibit underconfidence (see Ariel & Dunlosky, 2012; Tauber & Rhodes, 2012, for 
additional factors driving this effect). 
Applying a similar logic, the forgetting bias may reflect participants’ memory for past 
tests.  That is, when making a value judgment, participants may interrogate memory to determine 
whether an item was recalled on a prior test.  If it is deemed remembered, the item may be 
assigned a higher value than an item deemed forgotten (i.e., not recalled) on the prior test.  We 
investigated this account in Experiment 3 by asking participants to indicate whether an item was 
“remembered” or “forgotten” on the previous recall test, prior to making a value rating. In 
particular, if participants apply a general theory that remembered information is more valuable 
than forgotten information, value judgments should be higher for items deemed “remembered”, 
regardless of the actual status as a remembered or forgotten item.  A theory-based account would 
also predict that value judgments should be similar for all items deemed “forgotten”, independent 
of the objective status of an item as forgotten or remembered.  If participants do not rely on their 
memory-for-past-test to remember value, then value ratings should be differentiated based only 
on whether the item was remembered or forgotten and uninfluenced by memory for a past test.   
Such a pattern of findings, whereby items regarded as “remembered” are given higher 
values ratings, may be anticipated by the directed forgetting (DF) literature.  In particular, studies 
of item-method DF present participants with lists of items that alternate among instructions to 
forget (F) or remember (R) a particular item.  When subsequently tested on the list, memory is 
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generally superior for R items relative to F items, a finding that holds even when participants are 
instructed to recall or recognize all studied items, regardless of the original designation (e.g., 
Woodward & Bjork, 1971).  Several studies have asked participants to label recalled or 
recognized items as having been originally presented under R or F instructions (e.g., Davis & 
Okada, 1971; Gallant & Yang, 2014; Thompson, Fawcett, & Taylor, 2011; Woodward & Bjork, 
1971).  Although participants are generally accurate at identifying the origin of an item (e.g., 
Thompson et al., 2011), there is some evidence that errors are informed by a prior recall episode.  
For example, Woodward and Bjork (1971) had participants study multiple lists of words under 
item-method DF instructions.  Participants took an immediate test after each list with the goal of 
recalling only R items and then a final test, after all lists were presented, under instructions to 
recall any studied item.  Participants also identified any F items among the items output on the 
final test.  Although errors were infrequent, Woodward and Bjork (1971) noted that “…the 
immediate-recall history of a word heavily influenced whether the word was labeled as an F 
word or not” (p. 114).  In particular, R words not recalled on the initial test that were output on 
the final test were frequently mistakenly labeled as F words and F words recalled on the initial 
test that were output on a final test were likewise mistakenly labeled as R words.  Similarly, in 
the current study, the immediate recall history of items may influence the value ratings given, 
with prior recall positively related to value.  
In all, the experiments reported should serve to test the mechanism(s) driving the 
forgetting bias.  We note that these accounts are not entirely mutually exclusive.  For example, 
an item might be judged as “remembered” because it is highly familiar or fluent.  Such 
overlapping mechanisms would thus predict that manipulations of familiarity and fluency should 
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exert strong effects on retrospective assessments of value and result in patterns of data similar to 
differentiating items regarded as remembered or forgotten. 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1 we investigated a fluency-based account of the forgetting bias.  As noted 
previously, this account proposes that forgotten information may be perceived as less fluent (as a 
result of being initially forgotten) or less familiar and thus deemed less valuable than 
remembered information.  Accordingly, participants may attribute the ease with which an item is 
processed during the rating phase to the value associated with that item during the study phase 
and thus provide higher ratings of value to more fluent, remembered items relative to less fluent 
forgotten items (cf. Kelley & Rhodes, 2002).    
Experiment 1 tested this account by manipulating the ease with which items were 
perceived during the value-rating phase.  Specifically, following Castel et al. (2012), participants 
first studied four lists containing twelve words that were each randomly paired with a number 
from 1 to 12 specifying the value of the word. After the presentation of each list, participants 
engaged in a free recall test for the words from that list. Finally, participants were presented with 
each word they had studied and recalled the original value that was paired with that word. 
Importantly, we manipulated the fluency of the items during the value judgment by presenting 
words with either a high or low figure-ground contrast (cf. Werth & Strack, 2003). If fluency 
influences value ratings, then participants should assign higher values to words presented in the 
fluent condition (high figure-ground contrast) and lower values to words in the dis-fluent 
condition (low figure-ground contrast) regardless of whether they previously recalled those 
items. 
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Method 
Participants 
 Forty undergraduate students at Colorado State University participated in the experiment 
for partial course credit. 
Materials  
 Materials consisted of 60 nouns taken from the Kucera and Francis (1967) norms.  These 
were randomly divided into four sets of 12 items that were presented equally often in low- or 
high figure-ground contrast.  The sets were equated for frequency via the Kucera and Francis 
norms (M = 42.56; SE = 5.34), number of letters, (M = 5.94; SE = .21), and number of syllables 
(M = 2.02; SE = .11).  The remaining 12 items served as a practice list prior to beginning the 
study phase.  
Procedure 
 Participants were presented with four lists each containing 12 words. Words were 
presented on the screen for 2 s followed by the presentation of the next word. Each word was 
randomly assigned a value from 1 to 12, which was presented directly below the word. 
Participants were told to treat the value as points in a game whereby higher value words were 
worth more points. Further, participants were instructed to maximize their final point value by 
remembering as many words as possible. Following the presentation of each list, participants 
were given 1 minute to recall as many words from the previous list as possible on an answer 
sheet that was provided (they were not given feedback on performance). A practice list was 
presented prior to the four experimental lists to familiarize participants with the procedure.  The 
study-test procedure was repeated until all four experimental lists had been presented. The order 
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of the lists was counterbalanced such that each list occurred equally often at each position in the 
presentation order.  
 Following the presentation and recall of all lists, participants were presented with all of 
the words that they had previously studied. The words were blocked in the same lists from study, 
and lists were presented in the same order as they were studied.  Words within each list were 
randomized anew for each participant and were presented one-at-a-time in the center of the 
screen. Each word was randomly assigned to be presented in either high figure-ground contrast 
(i.e., high fluency; black words on a white background) or low figure-ground contrast (i.e., low 
fluency; lime green words on a cyan background)
1
. Participants were given an unlimited amount 
of time to recall the value that was initially assigned to the word.  Participants were encouraged 
to be as accurate as possible but no constraints were placed on their responses (i.e., the frequency 
of using a particular value was not constrained).  
Results 
As trials are nested within participants and values varied across the trials, our primary 
method of analysis was mixed-effects modeling with random participant effects (random item 
effects were not incorporated as the assignment of the value was counterbalanced across 
participants; see Murayama, Sakaki, Yan, & Smith, 2014). Random participant slopes as well as 
a random participant intercept were specified for all the main effects. Study lists were treated as 
fixed effects with three effect coded variables in the model. Prior to conducting analyses, study 
value was centered at the group mean (this was also the case for analyses in the subsequent 
                                                        
1 A small follow-up experiment with a lexical decision task confirmed that these variations in figure-ground contrast 
effectively manipulated the ease with which an item was processed.  In particular, twenty participants made lexical 
decisions to words and non-words, half of which were presented in high figure-ground contrast (black words on a 
white background) and half of which were presented in low-figure ground contrast (lime green words on a cyan 
background), using the same manipulation employed in Experiment 1.  Results showed that participants made 
decisions more rapidly when words were presented in high compared with low figure-ground contrast, F(1, 19) = 
20.13, p < .001, η2p = .514.  The complete details of this study are available by contacting the first author. 
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experiments). To facilitate ease of interpretation, all figures are presented with data collapsed 
into quartiles (i.e., values 1-3; 4-6; 7-9; 10-12); however, all analyses treated value as a 
continuous variable in the mixed-effects model.   
Recall.  Figure 1 displays the mean proportion of words recalled as a function of study 
value and fluency.  As expected, participants recalled more words that were paired with higher 
point values.  Overall, on average, participants recalled nearly half (M = 0.44; SE = 0.014) of the 
words.  A generalized mixed-effects model predicting recall performance (based on a Bernoulli 
distribution, with 0 = not recalled and 1 = recalled) from study value, fluency (effect coded -1 = 
low fluency, 1 = high fluency), the interaction between them, and study lists revealed that 
participants were more likely to recall words paired with higher values, Exp (b) = 1.22, z = 7.19, 
p < .01
2
.  Fluency condition also positively predicted recall performance, Exp (b) = 1.16, z = 2.75, 
p < .05.  Given that fluency was manipulated after the recall phase and randomly assigned to 
items, we treat this finding with caution and suggest that the effect on memory is likely spurious. 
 Value Ratings.  Of primary interest are value ratings for remembered versus forgotten 
items as a function of fluency.  If participants attribute fluent processing to items originally 
assigned a high value, then a main effect should be evident such that high-fluency items are 
given higher value ratings than low-fluency items.  In contrast to this hypothesis, Figure 2 shows 
little difference in remembered value across levels of fluency.  This was confirmed via a mixed-
effects model predicting remembered value from study value, recall (effect coded: -1 = forgot, 1 
= remembered; the variable was not centered to preserve the consistent meaning of -1 and 1 
across participants), fluency, their two-way and three-way interactions, and study lists. The 
                                                        
2 Exp (b) is interpreted as the effect of the independent variable on the odds ratio of the dependent measure being 
analyzed.  For example, the odds ratio of 1.22 reported for the effect of value means that the odds that an item is 
recalled is increased by 1.22 times as value is increased by one unit. 
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three-way interaction and the two way interactions between study value and fluency and between 
recall and fluency were not significant, zs < 1. There was also no main effect of fluency, z < 1. 
However, the results revealed main effects of study value, b = .17, z = 7.48, p < .01, and recall, b 
= 0.95, z = 8.18, p < .01. As evident from the beta value, participants assigned higher values to 
remembered words relative to forgotten words.  
Memory accuracy for the values associated with each item was modest (M = 0.15; SE = 
.011), but exceeded chance (.083), t(39) = 6.36.  Further, memory accuracy was not influenced 
by study value or fluency, zs < 1. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 replicated the forgetting bias reported by Castel et al. (2012).  Specifically, 
participants regarded remembered items as more valuable than forgotten items.  More 
importantly, there was little evidence that fluency had any impact on value ratings.  That is, 
value ratings did not differ for high-fluency versus low-fluency items and fluency did not interact 
with value or the status of an item as remembered or forgotten.  Thus, one might conclude that 
remembered value is independent of the experience participants might have or the attributions 
participants might make when attempting to remember the prior value of an item.  However, the 
findings are (a) dependent on a null effect for fluency and (b) reflect only one possible 
manipulation of fluency/familiarity (but see Reber & Schwarz, 1999).  Accordingly, in 
Experiment 2, we sought to employ a stronger manipulation of familiarity than was used in 
Experiment 1.   
As in Experiment 1, participants in Experiment 2 studied four lists of items, each 
randomly paired with a value, and followed by an immediate test of free recall.  However, prior 
to the judgment phase, participants were re-exposed to the study items so as to augment the 
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familiarity of those items.  Specifically, each item was presented, without their accompanying 
value, either once or three times in this familiarity phase.  Following the familiarity phase, 
participants were shown each item and asked to recall the accompanying value.  If participants 
mistakenly attribute familiarity to items of high value, then items presented three times should be 
regarded as more valuable than items presented once.  Such a pattern would suggest that 
participants, in part, use current processing to determine the prior value of an item. 
Method 
Participants 
 Sixty undergraduate students at Colorado State University participated for partial course 
credit. 
Materials and Procedure 
 
 The materials, initial study and recall phase were identical to Experiment 1.  Once the 
final list had been presented and the final recall test administered, participants in Experiment 2 
moved on to the familiarity phase when each list was presented for additional study, but without 
its original study value.  In this phase, words were presented in blocks corresponding to the order 
of the lists from the original study phase (e.g., the first list presented in the study phase 
comprised the first block of the familiarity phase, the second list of the study phase was the 
second block was the familiarity phase, etc.).  Half of the lists were presented once and half were 
presented three times with the number of presentations of a particular list counterbalanced across 
participants.  For lists presented three times, the entire list was presented before starting the list 
anew until all three presentations had been completed.  Prior to the familiarity phase, participants 
were instructed that they would have the opportunity to restudy each of the four previously 
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presented lists and were encouraged to carefully attend to the words. Words within each list were 
presented in a uniquely randomized order at a 2 s rate.   
Once all lists had been restudied, participants proceeded to the value-rating phase.  The 
procedure was identical to Experiment 1, with the exception that all words were presented in an 
identical manner (white font on a black background).  
Results 
Recall.  Figure 3 displays the mean proportion of words recalled as a function of study 
value and repetition.  On average, participants recalled nearly half (M = 0.42; SE = 0.01) of the 
words. As in Experiment 1, a generalized mixed-effect model predicting dichotomous recall 
performance from study value, familiarity (-1 = low familiarity, 1 = high familiarity), their 
interaction, and study lists showed that participants were more likely to recall words paired with 
higher study values, Exp (b) = 1.20, z = 8.84, p < .01. Familiarity was not significantly related to 
recall performance, z < 1. 
Value Ratings.  As in Experiment 1, our primary interest was in value ratings for 
remembered versus forgotten items as a function of repetition.  If people use the familiarity of an 
item as an index of its value, then repeated items should be regarded as more valuable than items 
presented only once prior to the judgment phase.  We performed a mixed-effects model 
predicting remembered value from study value, recall (effect coded), familiarity, their two-way 
and three-way interactions, and study lists.  
The three-way interaction and the interaction between study value and familiarity was not 
significant, zs < 1. The main effects of study value, recall, and familiarity were all significant, bs 
= 0.15, 0.54, and 0.20, zs = 7.73, 6.36, and 3.23, ps < .01. These effects were qualified by two 
significant two-way interactions. First, there was a significant interaction between study value 
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and recall, b = .07, z = 4.05, p < .01. Simple slope tests revealed a positive relationship between 
study value and remembered value for forgotten items, b = .08, z = 3.41, p < .01, as well as for 
remembered items, b = .22, t = 7.98, p < .01. This effect was particularly strong for remembered 
items, leading to the interaction.  
There was also a significant interaction between recall and familiarity, b = -.17, z = 2.96, 
p < .01. Follow-up tests showed that, for forgotten items, remembered value was higher for 
words presented 3 times relative to those presented once, b = .37, t = 4.84, p < .01. Conversely, 
remembered value was not influenced by repetition for remembered items, z < 1.  
Memory accuracy for the values associated with each item (M = 0.13; SE = .01), 
exceeded chance (.083), t(59) = 5.39. Further, memory accuracy was not influenced by study 
value or fluency, zs < 1.34.  
Experiment 3 
 As in Experiment 1, participants in Experiment 2 provided higher value ratings for 
remembered than forgotten items.  More importantly, Experiment 2 provided moderate support 
for the influence of familiarity on participants’ value ratings.  Specifically, whereas the 
manipulation of familiarity was unrelated to value ratings for remembered items, participants 
accorded forgotten items higher value ratings when they had been seen three times rather than 
once during the familiarity phase.  However, we note that the influence of familiarity on value 
ratings was still comparatively modest relative to whether an item was remembered or forgotten.  
Combined with the results of Experiment 1, such data suggest that attributions about current 
processing made during the judgment phase plays, at most, a minor role in the forgetting bias, in 
contrast to Castel et al.’s (2012) speculation.   
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In Experiment 3 we explored an alternative account of the forgetting bias.  As noted 
previously, one possibility is that participants assign a value to an item following a two-stage 
process.  First, participants may attempt to remember whether an item was recalled during the 
initial phase.  Next, based on this judgment, items that are remembered as “recalled” are assigned 
a value within the upper end of the possible range of values and items remembered as 
“forgotten” are assigned a low value in the possible range of values.  Thus, memory for a past 
test may lead participants to consider higher or lower values based on whether the item was 
forgotten or remembered.   
To create the pattern described, with remembered items consistently deemed more 
valuable than forgotten items, participants would need to be reasonably good at remembering 
their performance on a past test.  For example, were memory-for-past-test near chance, applying 
a theory would be ineffective and lead to similar values for remembered compared with forgotten 
items.  This concern appears unwarranted, as several prior studies suggest that participants can 
remember past test performance at levels that far exceed chance (Finn & Metcalfe, 2008; 
Gardiner & Klee, 1976).     
We investigated a memory-for-past-test account of the forgetting bias in Experiment 3.  
As in the prior experiments, participants studied items randomly paired with values and were 
immediately tested on these items.  During the subsequent value judgment phase, we solicited 
two judgments for each item.  First, participants were asked to indicate whether the item was 
“remembered” or “forgotten” when they were tested. Next, they were asked to recall the value 
that was paired with the item.  Based on prior work (Finn & Metcalfe, 2008; Gardiner & Klee, 
1976), we anticipated that participants would be reasonably proficient at remembering prior 
recall performance.  More importantly, identifying whether an item was deemed remembered or 
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forgotten allowed us to investigate a theory-based approach to value judgments.  In particular, if 
participants apply a general theory that remembered information is more valuable than forgotten 
information, value judgments should be similar for items deemed “remembered”, regardless of 
whether the item was actually remembered or forgotten and higher than value judgments for 
items deemed “forgotten”.  Likewise, value judgments should be similar for all items deemed 
“forgotten”, regardless of the objective status of an item as forgotten or remembered.  If 
memory-for-past test does not influence judgment, then value ratings should be affected only by 
whether the item was remembered or forgotten and uninfluenced by memory for a past test.  We 
tested these possibilities in Experiment 3. 
Method 
Participants 
 Sixty undergraduate students at Texas Christian University participated in the experiment 
for partial course credit. 
Materials and Procedure 
 The materials used and the procedure for Experiment 3 were identical to Experiment 2 
with two major exceptions.  First, participants did not engage in restudy (i.e., a familiarity phase) 
prior to the value rating task.  Second, the procedure for the value rating task was altered.  
Specifically, for each item, participants first indicated whether that item had been recalled during 
the initial test phase.  Next, participants provided a value rating for the item in the same manner 
as in Experiment 2.    
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Results 
 Recall.  Overall, participants recalled 43% of the words. We performed a generalized 
mixed-effects model predicting recall (dichotomous variable) from study value, memory for past 
accuracy (effect coded; -1 = “not correctly recalled”, 1 = “correctly recalled”; the variable was 
not centered to preserve the consistent meaning of -1 and 1 across participants), their interaction, 
and study lists. The results (see Figure 5) revealed a main effect of study value, Exp (b)  = 1.26, z 
= 8.14, p < .01, as participants remembered more valuable information. Memory for past test 
also predicted recall, Exp (b)  = 1.73, z = 3.54, p < .01, indicating that items that were correctly 
judged were associated with better recall.    
 Judgments of Recall.  We first examined the accuracy of memory for past test by 
assessing how frequently participants correctly identified a remembered item as “recalled” and a 
forgotten item as “not recalled” (see Figure 6).  A mixed-effects model predicting memory 
accuracy from study value, memory status (effect coded: -1 = forgotten, 1 = remembered), their 
interaction, and study lists showed that there was a main effect of study value, Exp (b)  = 0.94, z 
= 3.49, p < .01, indicating that, while controlling for memory status (i.e., whether the item was 
remembered or forgotten), participants’ memory for past test decreased with increasing study 
value. Further, there was also a main effect of memory status, Exp (b)  = 1.58, t = 3.12, p < .01, 
such that, while controlling for study value, memory for past test was more accurate for 
remembered items relative to forgotten items. Value did not interact with Memory Status, z < 1. 
 A more conventional way to analyze these data is in terms of signal detection theory (see 
Table 1) by the proportion of items judged “recalled”.  A hit corresponded to remembered items 
correctly deemed “recalled” and a false alarm corresponded to forgotten items incorrectly 
classified as “recalled”.  For each participant, only 4 items were associated with a particular 
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value, rendering calculations necessary for signal detection analyses untenable. Thus, we 
grouped each value into quartiles, starting from the lowest values (1-3) to the highest values (10-
12), to make signal detection calculations. 
The proportion of items deemed “recalled” were analyzed in a 2 (Memory Status: 
recalled, not recalled) x 4 (Value: 1-3, 4-6, 7-9, 10-12) repeated-measures ANOVA.  Overall, 
hits (M = 0.794; SE = .029) greatly exceeded false alarms (M = 0.350; SE = .040), F(1, 51) = 
92.836, p < .001, η2 = .645.  The proportion of items called “recalled” did not vary as a function 
of Value nor did Value interact with Memory Status, Fs < 1.   Further analyses showed that 
measures of discriminability (d’) and response criterion (C’) did not differ by value, Fs < 1.  
Thus, on the whole, participants were adept at discriminating recalled from forgotten items but 
performance was far from ceiling. 
 Value Ratings.  Participants in Experiment 3 indicated whether an item was remembered 
or forgotten on the initial test.  Accordingly, we can assess value ratings both when there is a 
correspondence between memory for past test and objective performance (e.g., an item was 
remembered and correctly deemed “remembered”) and for instances where the judgment 
diverges from objective performance (e.g., an item was forgotten but incorrectly deemed 
“remembered”).  As noted previously, if participants apply a general theory that remembered 
information is more valuable than forgotten information, then value judgments should be higher 
for items deemed “remembered”, regardless of the actual status as a remembered or forgotten 
item.  Similarly, items deemed “forgotten” should be given lower value judgments than 
remembered information, regardless of the actual status of the item as remembered or forgotten. 
 Figure 7 displays value ratings for remembered and forgotten items as a function of value 
and based on whether the item was correctly judged or not.  By this classification system, 
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remembered items that were correctly judged were deemed “remembered” whereas remembered 
items associated with an error in judgment were deemed “forgotten”.  The same classification 
applies to forgotten items, such that forgotten items correctly judged were deemed “forgotten” 
whereas forgotten items associated with an error in judgment were deemed “remembered”.  A 
mixed-model was conducted to evaluate value ratings predicted by study value, recall (effect 
coded; -1 = forgotten, 1 = remembered), memory for past test accuracy, their two-way and three-
way interactions, and study lists. The results revealed a significant main effect of study value, b 
= 0.11, z = 4.25, p < .01. The main effect of recall and memory for past test accuracy were not 
significant, zs < 1.43. There was also a significant interaction between recall and memory for 
past test accuracy, b = 0.94, z = 11.72, p < .01. Furthermore, these effects were qualified by a 
significant three-way interaction, b = .06, z = 2.83, p < .05.  
To elucidate this interaction, we computed a simple interaction between recall and 
memory for past test accuracy at low (1 SD below the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) 
study values. The interaction effect was stronger when study value was high, b = 1.17, z = 12.41, 
p < .01. This interaction indicates that value judgments were higher for items deemed 
“remembered”, regardless of whether the item was actually remembered or forgotten item. The 
interaction effect was weaker when study value was low, but the interaction was still significant 
and showed the same pattern, b = .72, z = 5.48, p < .01. Overall, these results comport with the 
hypothesis that value judgments are higher for items deemed “remembered” than for those 
deemed “forgotten”, regardless whether the item was actually remembered or forgotten item.   
Recall accuracy for the values associated with each item was modest (M = 0.142; SE = 
.023), but exceeded chance (.083), t(87) = 3.257, p = .002.  In addition, as value increased, 
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participants’ cued recall accuracy decreased, b = -.09, z = 3.05, p < .01.  Given that cued-recall 
accuracy was near floor, we do not further interpret this finding. 
General Discussion 
 The current study demonstrated that people deem forgotten information to be less 
valuable than remembered information and tested two possible mechanisms that drive this 
finding. Our results suggest that the fluency or familiarity of an item being judged plays a minor 
role in participants’ value judgments.  For example, manipulating the ease with which an item 
could be read had no impact on participants’ value judgment (Experiment 1).  Moreover, 
manipulating the familiarity of an item by varying the number of presentations prior to judgment 
had little impact on value ratings, confined only to value ratings for forgotten items previously 
seen three times (Experiment 2).   We note that we have certainly not exhausted the possible 
range and nature of manipulations of fluency that might influence attribution.  Indeed, effects of 
familiarity may be more prevalent when participants are unaware of the source of fluency (e.g., 
Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989) or when a sub-set of items are particularly fluent relative to other 
items (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Wänke & Hansen, 2015; Westerman, 2008).  For example, 
fluency effects might be enhanced were item repetition manipulated within-lists rather than 
between-lists.  Thus, the potential role of fluency and familiarity in the forgetting bias warrants 
continued exploration.    
 Evidence from Experiment 3 largely favors an account of the forgetting bias based on 
memory for the outcome of a prior test (Finn & Metcalfe, 2008; Serra & Ariel, 2014).  In 
particular, participants in Experiment 3 first indicated whether an item was remembered on the 
initial test of free recall prior to judging the value of that item.  Based on a memory-for-past-test 
account, items deemed “remembered” should be accorded higher ratings than items deemed 
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“forgotten”, regardless of the objective status of that item as remembered or forgotten.  Our 
results were consistent with this prediction.  For example, consider the data shown in Figure 7 
for items that were objectively (actually) remembered.  Those items that were correctly judged 
“remembered” garnered considerably higher ratings than items incorrectly judged to be 
“forgotten”.  A similar pattern was apparent for objectively forgotten items, with items correctly 
judged “forgotten” given substantially lower ratings than forgotten items incorrectly judged as 
“remembered”.  Thus, our data suggest that it is not the objective status of an item as 
remembered or forgotten that drove value judgments, but the perceived status of the item as 
“remembered” or “forgotten”, based on memory for past test, that was the most important 
factor
3
. 
 Such a mechanism based on memory for a past test may reflect an adaptive use of 
memory (e.g., Anderson & Schooler, 2000; Bjork, 2011; Schooler & Hertwig, 2005).  Indeed, 
memory may be attuned to the environment such that the most important information is also the 
most accessible.  Important information should also garner more resources than less accessible 
information.  For example, individuals should be more likely to persist in a search for more 
important or valuable information and terminate search more quickly for information that is less 
valuable (cf. Dougherty & Harbison, 2007; see Ariel, Dunlosky, & Bailey, 2009, for a similar 
idea applied to study choices during encoding).  This strategy might be adaptive but our data 
suggest some circumstances in which it may be misapplied.  For example, although our 
participants were quite good at identifying which information was previously forgotten or 
                                                        
3 The key observations in Experiment 3, instances in which the judgment as “remembered” or “forgotten” is 
inconsistent with the objective status of the status of the item, comprises only a minority of the data.  Specifically, in 
Experiment 3, participants incorrectly judged approximately 20% of the items.  Accordingly, we replicated 
Experiment 3 by testing 56 subjects at Colorado State University using the same procedure.  The results produced 
the same pattern of data whereby the perceived status of an item played a greater role in value ratings than the 
objective status of the item.  The full set of data and analyses from this replication are available from the first author. 
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remembered, they were far from perfect, suggesting that some information may be mistakenly 
regarded as forgotten and thus unimportant.   
Further, beliefs regarding the influence of value on memory may not be entirely accurate.  
For instance, individuals appear to hold a theory that information rendered important after 
encoding, when value would have little impact on memory, should still be quite memorable 
(Kassam, Gilbert, Swencionis, & Wilson, 2009; Soderstrom & McCabe, 2011).  As illustrative, 
Soderstrom and McCabe (2011) had participants study pairs of words randomly associated with 
a value from 1 to 6 and judge the likelihood of remembering that information in the future.  
Value information was presented either before the pair was studied or after it was studied, when 
it would not influence encoding.  Their results showed that participants provided greater 
predictions of performance for more valuable information, regardless of when that information 
was presented.  Thus, although the forgetting bias reported here and elsewhere (Castel et al., 
2012) may reflect adaptive mechanisms based on a general belief or theory about memory, we do 
not argue for the unqualified sagacity of this view.  Future work will profit by exploring the 
implications of such a theory for control over memory processes. 
 In all, we attempted to determine the source of why people devalue forgotten 
information.  Our results indicate that forgotten information is retrospectively deemed less 
important than remembered information. This bias does not appear to be driven by perceptions of 
the fluency of an item or its familiarity.  Rather, our data suggest that individuals invoke a theory 
about the value of remembered or forgotten information by interrogating memory for 
performance on a past test.  By this theory, information judged as having been remembered is 
deemed to be more important than information judged as having been forgotten, regardless of 
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whether this comports with the actual state of memory on a past test.  Thus, our memory for the 
past informs the relevance of the present.  
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Table 1. 
Mean Recognition Performance for Past Test by Value in Experiment 3.   
   
Value  Hits False Alarms d′ C   
1-3  0.93  (0.02) 0.25  (0.03) 3.01  (.16) -0.50  (0.10) 
4-6  0.86  (0.03) 0.22  (0.03) 2.74  (.17) -0.17  (0.11) 
7-9  0.88  (0.02) 0.28  (0.04) 2.51  (.17) -0.32  (0.11) 
10-12 0.86  (0.02) 0.34  (0.04) 2.06  (.17) -0.34  (0.13)   
Note: Hits represent instances of correctly classifying a recalled item as “remembered”.  False 
alarms represent instances of erroneously classifying a forgotten item as “remembered”.  d’ = 
Discriminability; C = Response Criterion. Standard errors of the mean are in parentheses.   
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Figure 1: The mean proportion recalled as a function of point value (in groups of 3) and fluency 
in Experiment 1. Errors bars reflect one standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 2.  The mean remembered value for words that were initially remembered and words that 
were initially forgotten in Experiment 1 as a function of fluency and actual value (in groups of 
3).  Errors bars reflect one standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 3. The mean proportion recalled as a function of point value (in groups of 3) and 
repetition in Experiment 2. Errors bars reflect one standard error of the mean. Note: Rep = 
Repetition 
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Figure 4.  The mean remembered value and actual value for words that were initially 
remembered and words that were initially forgotten in Experiment 2 as a function of repetition 
and point value (in groups of 3).  Errors bars reflect one standard error of the mean.  Note: Rep = 
Repetition 
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Figure 5.  The mean proportion recalled as a function of point value (in groups of 3) in 
Experiment 3. Errors bars reflect one standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 6.  The mean proportion of remembered and forgotten items correctly judged as a 
function of point value (in groups of 3) in Experiment 3.   
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Figure 7.  The mean remembered value and actual value for words that were initially 
remembered and words that were initially forgotten as a function of whether or not it was 
correctly judged in Experiment 3.  A correct judgment would entail a remembered item being 
deemed “remembered” and a forgotten item being deemed “forgotten”.  An error in judgment 
would entail a remembered item being judged “forgotten” and a forgotten item being judged 
“remembered”.  Errors bars represent one standard error of the mean. 
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